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ABSTRACT
Automated rationale generation is an approach for real-time
explanation generation whereby a computational model learns
to translate an autonomous agent’s internal state and action
data representations into natural language. Training on
human explanation data can enable agents to learn to generate
human-like explanations for their behavior. In this paper,
using the context of an agent that plays Frogger, we describe
(a) how to collect a corpus of explanations, (b) how to train
a neural rationale generator to produce different styles of
rationales, and (c) how people perceive these rationales. We
conducted two user studies. The first study establishes the
plausibility of each type of generated rationale and situates
their user perceptions along the dimensions of confidence,
humanlike-ness, adequate justification, and understandability.
The second study further explores user preferences between
the generated rationales with regard to confidence in the
autonomous agent, communicating failure and unexpected
behavior. Overall, we find alignment between the intended
differences in features of the generated rationales and the
perceived differences by users. Moreover, context permitting,
participants preferred detailed rationales to form a stable
mental model of the agent’s behavior.
INTRODUCTION
Explainable AI refers to artificial intelligence and machine
learning techniques that can provide human understandable
justification for their behavior. Explainability is important in
situations where human operators work alongside autonomous
and semi-autonomous systems because it can help build
rapport, confidence, and understanding between the agent
and its operator. In the event that an autonomous system
fails to complete a task or completes it in an unexpected
way, explanations help the human collaborator understand
the circumstances that led to the behavior, which also allows
the operator to make an informed decision on how to address
the behavior.
.
Prior work on explainable AI (XAI) has primarily focused
on non-sequential problems such as image classification and
captioning [40, 42, 44]. Since these environments are
episodic in nature, the model’s output depends only on its
input. In sequential environments, decisions that the agent
has made in the past influence future decisions. To simplify
this, agents often make locally optimal decisions by selecting
actions that maximize some discrete notion of expected future
reward or utility. To generate plausible explanations in these
environments, the model must unpack this local reward or
utility to reason about how current actions affect future actions.
On top of that, it needs to communicate the reasoning in
a human understandable way, which is a difficult task. To
address this challenge of human understandable explanation
in sequential environments, we introduce the alternative task
of rationale generation in sequential environments.
Automated rationale generation is a process of producing
a natural language explanation for agent behavior as if a
human had performed the behavior [17]. The intuition
behind rationale generation is that humans can engage in
effective communication by verbalizing plausible motivations
for their action. The communication can be effective even
when the verbalized reasoning does not have a consciously
accessible neural correlate of the decision-making process [9,
8, 19]. Whereas an explanation can be in any communication
modality, rationales are natural language explanations that
don’t literally expose the inner workings of an intelligent
system. Explanations can be made by exposing the inner
representations and data of a system, though this type of
explanation may not be accessible or understandable to
non-experts. In contrast, contextually appropriate natural
language rationales are accessible and intuitive to non-experts,
facilitating understanding and communicative effectiveness.
Human-like communication can also afford human factors
advantages such as higher degrees of satisfaction, confidence,
rapport, and willingness to use autonomous systems. Finally,
rationale generation is fast, sacrificing an accurate view of
agent decision-making for real-time response, making it
appropriate for real-time human-agent collaboration. Should
deeper, more grounded and technical explanations be
necessary, rationale generation may need to be supplemented
by other explanation or visualization techniques.
In preliminary work [17] we showed that recurrent neural
networks can be used to translate internal state and action
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representations into natural language. That study, however,
relied on synthetic natural language data for training. In
this work, we explore if human-like plausible rationales can
be generated using a non-synthetic, natural language corpus
of human-produced explanations. To create this corpus, we
developed a methodology for conducting remote think-aloud
protocols [20]. Using this corpus, we then use a neural
network based on [17] to translate an agent’s state and action
information into natural language rationales, and show how
variations in model inputs can produce two different types of
rationales. Two user studies help us understand the perceived
quality of the generated rationales along dimensions of human
factors. The first study indicates that our rationale generation
technique produces plausible and high-quality rationales and
explains the differences in user perceptions. In addition to
understanding user preferences, the second study demonstrates
how the intended design behind the rationale types aligns with
their user perceptions.
The philosophical and linguistic discourse around the notion
of explanations [31, 26] is beyond the scope of this paper. To
avoid confusion, we use the word ”rationale” to refer to natural
language-based post-hoc explanations that are meant to sound
like what a human would say in the same situation. We opt
for ”rationale generation” instead of ”rationalization” to signal
that the agency lies with the receiver and interpreter (human
being) instead of the producer (agent). Moreover, the word
rationalization may carry a connotation of making excuses [30]
for an (often controversial) action, which is another reason
why we opt for rationale generation as a term of choice.
In this paper, we make the following contributions in this
paper:
• We present a methodology for collecting high-quality
human explanation data based on remote think-aloud
protocols.
• We show how this data can be used to configure neural
translation models to produce two types of human-like
rationales: (1) concise, localized and (2) detailed, holistic
rationales. We demonstrate the alignment between the
intended design of rationale types and the actual perceived
differences between them.
• We quantify the perceived quality of the rationales and
preferences between them, and we use qualitative data to
explain these perceptions and preferences.
RELATED WORK
Much of the previous work on explainable AI has focused
on interpretability. While there is no one definition of
interpretability with respect to machine learning models, we
view interpretability as a property of machine learned models
that dictate the degree to which a human user—AI expert
or user—can come to conclusions about the performance
of the model on specific inputs. Some types of models
are inherently interpretable, meaning they require relatively
little effort to understand. Other types of models require
more effort to make sense of their performance on specific
inputs. Some non-inherently interpretable models can be
made interpretable in a post-hoc fashion through explanation
or visualization. Model-agnostic post-hoc methods can
help to make models intelligible without custom explanation
or visualization technologies and without changing the
underlying model to make them more interpretable [37, 43].
Explanation generation can be described as a form
of post-hoc interpretability [27, 31]; explanations are
generated on-demand based on the current state of a model
and—potentially—meta-knowledge about how the algorithm
works. An important distinction between interpretability and
explanation is that explanation does not elucidate precisely
how a model works but aims to give useful information
for practitioners and end users. Abdul et al. [2] conduct a
comprehensive survey on trends in explainable and intelligible
systems research.
Our work on rationale generation is a model-agnostic
explanation system that works by translating the internal
state and action representations of an arbitrary reinforcement
learning system into natural language. Andreas, Dragan,
and Klein [3] describe a technique that translates
message-passing policies between two agents into natural
language. An alternative approach to translating internal
system representations into natural language is to add
explanations to a supervised training set such that a model
learns to output a classification as well as an explanation [13].
This technique has been applied to generating explanations
about procedurally generated game level designs [21].
Beyond the technology, user perception and acceptance matter
because they influence trust in the system, which is crucial
to adoption of the technology. Established fields such as
information systems enjoy a robust array of technology
acceptance models such as the Technology Acceptance Model
(TAM) [14] and Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of
Technology Model (UTAUT) [39] whose main goal is to
explain variables that influence user perceptions. Utilizing
dimensions such as perceived usefulness and perceived ease of
use, the TAM model aimed to explain prospective expectations
about the technological artifacts. UTAUT uses constructs like
performance expectancy, effort expectancy, etc. to understand
technology acceptance. The constructs and measures in these
models build on each other.
In contrast, due to a rapidly evolving domain, a robust and
well-accepted user perception model of XAI agents is yet to
be developed. Until then, we can take inspiration from general
acceptance models (such as TAM and UTAUT) and adapt
their constructs to understand the perceptions of XAI agents.
For instance, the human-robot interaction community has
used them as basis to understand users’ perceptions towards
robots [18, 6]. While these acceptance models are informative,
they often lack sociability factors such as ”humanlike-ness”.
Moreover, TAM-like models does not account for autonomy
in systems, let alone autonomous XAI systems. Building on
some constructs from TAM-like models and original formative
work, we attempt to address the gaps in understanding user
perceptions of rationale-generating XAI agents.
Figure 1: End-to-end pipeline for training a system that can
generate explanations.
The dearth of established methods combined with the variable
conceptions of explanations make evaluation of XAI systems
challenging. Binns et al. [7] use scenario-based survey
design [11] and presented different types of hypothetical
explanations for the same decision to measure perceived
levels of justice. One non-neural based network evaluates
the usefulness and naturalness of generated explanations [10].
Rader et al. [36] use explanations manually generated from
content analysis of Facebook’s News Feed to study perceptions
of algorithmic transparency. One key differentiating factor
of our approach is that our evaluation is based rationales that
are actual system outputs (compared to hypothetical ones).
Moreover, user perceptions of our system’s rationales directly
influence the design of our rationale generation technique.
LEARNING TO GENERATE RATIONALES
We define a rationale as an explanation that justifies an action
based on how a human would think. These rationales do not
necessarily reveal the true decision making process of an agent,
but still provide insights about why an agent made a decision
in a form that is easy for non-experts to understand.
Rationale generation requires translating events in the game
environment into natural language outputs. Our approach to
rationale generation involves two steps: (1) collect a corpus
of think-aloud data from players who explained their actions
in a game environment; and (2) use this corpus to train an
encoder-decoder network to generate plausible rationales for
any action taken by an agent (see Figure 1).
We experiment with rationale generation using autonomous
agents that play the arcade game, Frogger. Frogger is a good
candidate for our experimental design of a rationale generation
pipeline for general sequential decision making tasks because
it is a simple Markovian environment, making it an ideal
stepping stone towards a real world environment. Our rationale
generation technique is agnostic to the type of agent or how it
is trained, as long as the representations of states and actions
used by the agent can be exposed to the rationale generator
and serialized.
Figure 2: Players take an action and verbalize their rationale
for that action. (1) After taking each action, the game pauses
for 10 seconds. (2) Speech-to-text transcribes the participant’s
rationale for the action. (3) Participants can view their
transcribed rationales near real-time and edit if needed.
Data Collection Interface
There is no readily available dataset for the task of learning
to generate explanations. Thus, we developed a methodology
to collect live “think-aloud” data from players as they played
through a game. This section covers the two objectives of our
data collection endeavor:
1. Create a think-aloud protocol in which players provide
natural rationales for their actions.
2. Design an intuitive player experience that facilitates
accurate matching of the participants’ utterances to the
appropriate state in the environment.
To train a rationale-generating explainable agent, we need
data linking game states and actions to their corresponding
natural language explanations. To achieve this goal, we built a
modified version of Frogger in which players simultaneously
play the game and also explain each of their actions. The entire
process is divided into three phases: (1) A guided tutorial,
(2) rationale collection, and (3) transcribed explanation review.
During the guided tutorial (1), our interface provides
instruction on how to play through the game, how to provide
natural language explanations, and how to review/modify any
explanations they have given. This helps ensure that users
are familiar with the interface and its use before they begin
providing explanations.
For rationale collection (2), participants play through the
game while explaining their actions out loud in a turn-taking
mechanism. Figure 2 shows the game embedded into the
explanation collection interface. To help couple explanations
with actions (attach annotations to concrete game states), the
game pauses for 10 seconds after each action is taken. During
this time, the player’s microphone automatically turns on
and the player is asked to explain their most recent action
Figure 3: Players can step-through each of their
action-rationale pairs and edit if necessary. (1) Players can
watch an action-replay while editing rationales. (2) These
buttons control the flow of the step-through process. (3) The
rationale for the current action gets highlighted for review.
while a speech-to-text library [1] automatically transcribes
the explanation real-time. The automatic transcription
substantially reduces participant burden as it is more efficient
than typing an explanation. Player can use more or less than
the default 10-second pause to collect the explanation. Once
done explaining, they can view their transcribed text and edit
it if necessary. During pretesting with 14 players, we observed
that players often repeat a move for which the explanation
is the same as before. To reduce burden of repetition, we
added a ”redo” button that can be used to recycle rationales
for consecutive repeated actions.
When the game play is over, players move to transcribed
explanation review portion (3). Here, they can can step
through all the actions-explanation pairs. This stage allows
reviewing in both a situated and global context.
The interface is designed so that no manual
hand-authoring/editing of our explanation data was
required before using it to train our machine learning
model. Throughout the game, players have the opportunity
to organically edit their own data without impeding their
work-flow. This added layer of organic editing is crucial
in ensuring that we can directly input the collected data
into the network with zero manual cleaning. While we use
Frogger as a test environment in our experiments, a similar
user experience can be designed using other turn-based
environments with minimal effort.
Neural Translation Model
We use an encoder-decoder network [5] to teach our network
to generate relevant natural language explanations for any
given action. These kinds of networks are commonly used
for machine translation tasks or dialogue generation, but
their ability to understand sequential dependencies between
the input and the output make it suitable for our task.
Our encoder decoder architecture is similar to that used
in [17]. The network learns how to translate the input
game state representation X = x1,x2, ...,xn, comprised of the
representation of the game combined with other influencing
factors, into an output rationale as a sequence of words
Y = y1,y2, ...,ym where yi is a word. Thus our network learns
to translate game state and action information into natural
language rationales.
The encoder and decoder are both recurrent neural networks
(RNN) comprised of Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) cells since
our training process involved a small amount of data. The
decoder network uses an additional attention mechanism [29]
to learn to weight the importance of different components of
the input with regard to their effect on the output.
To simplify the learning process, the state of the game
environment is serialized into a sequence of symbols
where each symbol characterizes a sprite in the grid-based
represntation of the world. To this, we append information
concerning Frogger’s position, the most recent action taken,
and the number of lives the player has left to create the
input representation X . On top of this network structure, we
vary the input configurations with the intention of producing
varying styles of rationales. Empirically, we found that a
reinforcement learning agent using tabular Q-learning [41]
learns to play the game effectively when given a limited
window for observation. Thus a natural configuration for
the rationale generator is to give it the same observation
window that the agent needs to learn to play. We refer to
this configuration of the rationale generator as focused-view
generator. This view, however, potentially limits the types
of rationales that can be learned since the agent will only be
able to see a subset of the full state. Thus we formulated
a second configuration that gives the rationale generator the
ability to use all information on the board to produce rationales.
We refer to this as complete-view generator. An underlying
question is thus whether rationale generation should use the
same information that the underlying black box reasoner needs
to solve a problem or if more information is advantageous at
the expense of making rationale generation a harder problem.
In the studies described below, we seek to understand how
these configurations affect human perceptions of the agent
when presented with generated rationales.
Focused-view Configuration
In the focused-view configuration, we used a windowed
representation of the grid, i.e. only a 7× 7 window around
the Frog was used in the input. Both playing an optimal game
of Frogger and generating relevant explanations based on the
current action taken typically only requires this much local
context. Therefore providing the agent with only the window
around Frogger helps the agent produce explanations grounded
in it’s neighborhood. In this configuration, we designed the
inputs such that the network is prone to prioritize short-term
planning producing localized rationales instead of long-term
planning.
Complete-view Configuration
The complete-view configuration is an alternate setup
that provides the entire game board as context for the
rationale generation. There are two differences between this
configuration and the focused-view configuration. First, we
use the entire game screen as a part of the input. The agent
now has the opportunity to learn which other long-term factors
in the game may influence it’s rationale. Second, we added
noise to each game state to force the network to generalize
when learning, reduce the likelihood that spurious correlations
are identified, and to give the model equal opportunity to
consider factors from all sectors of the game screen. In this
case noise was introduced by replacing input grid values with
dummy values. For each grid element, there was a 20% chance
that it would get replaced with a dummy value. Given the
input structure and scope, this configuration should prioritize
rationales that exhibit long-term planning and consider the
broader context.
Table 1: Examples of focused-view vs complete-view
rationales generated by our system for the same set of actions.
Action Focused-view Complete-view
Right I had cars to the left
and in front of me so I
needed to move to the
right to avoid them.
I moved right to be more
centered. This way I
have more time to react
if a car comes from
either side.
Up The path in front of me
was clear so it was safe
for me to move forward.
I moved forward making
sure that the truck won't
hit me so I can move
forward one spot.
Left I move to the left so I can
jump onto the next log.
I moved to the left
because it looks like the
logs and top or not going
to reach me in time, and
I'm going to jump off if
the law goes to the right
of the screen.
Down I had to move back so
that I do not fall off.
I jumped off the log
because the middle log
was not going to come
in time. So I need to
make sure that the laws
are aligned when I jump
all three of them.
PERCEPTION STUDY: CANDIDATE VS. BASELINE
RATIONALES
In this section, we assess whether the rationales generated
using our technique are plausible and explore how humans
perceive them along various dimensions of human factors. For
our rationales to be plausible we would expect that human
users indicate a strong preference for rationales generated
by our system (either configuration) over those generated
by a baseline rationale generator. We also compare them
to exemplary human-produced explanations to get a sense for
how far from the upper bound we are.
This study aims to achieve two main objectives. First, it
seeks to confirm the hypothesis that humans prefer rationales
generated by each of the configurations over randomly selected
rationales across all dimensions. While this baseline is low,
it establishes that rationales generated by our technique are
not nonsensical. We can also measure the distance from the
upper-bound (exemplary human rationales) for each rationale
type. Second, we attempt to understand the underlying
Figure 4: Screenshot from user study (setup 2) depicting the
action taken and the rationales: P = Random, Q = Exemplary,
R = Candidate
components that influence the perceptions of the generated
rationales along four dimensions of human factors: confidence,
human-likeness, adequate justification, and understandability.
Method
To gather the training set of game state annotations, we
deployed our data collection pipeline on Turk Prime [28].
From 60 participants we collected over 2000 samples of human
actions in Frogger coupled with natural language explanations.
The average duration of this task was around 36 minutes. The
parallel corpus of the collected game state images and natural
language explanations was used to train the encoder-decoder
network. Each RNN in the encoder and the decoder was
parameterized with GRU cells with a hidden vector size of
256. The entire encoder-decoder network was trained for 100
epochs.
For the perception user study, we collected both within-subject
and between-subject data. We recruited 128 participants, split
into two equal experimental groups through TurkPrime: Group
1 (age range = 23 - 68 years, M = 37.4, SD = 9.92) and Group
2 (age range = 24 - 59 years, M = 35.8, SD= 7.67). On average,
the task duration was approximately 49 minutes. 46% of our
participants were women, and the 93% of participants were
self-reported as from the United States while the remaining
7% of participants were self-reported as from India.
All participants watched a counterbalanced series of five
videos. Each video depicted an action taken by Frogger
accompanied by three different types of rationales that
justified the action (see Figure 4). Participants rated each
rationale on a labeled, 5-point, bipolar Likert-scale along
4 perception dimensions (described below). Thus, each
participant provided 12 ratings per action, leading to 60
perception ratings for five actions. Actions collected from
human players comprised the set of Frogger’s actions. These
actions were then fed into the system to generate rationales to
be evaluated in the the user studies. In order to get a balance
between participant burden, fatigue, the number of actions,
and regions of the game, we pretested with 12 participants.
Five actions was the limit beyond which participants’ fatigue
and burden substantially increased. Therefore, we settled on
five actions (up (twice), down, left, and right) in the major
regions of the game– amongst the cars, at a transition point,
and amongst the logs. This allowed us to test our rationale
generation configurations in all possible action-directions in
all the major sections of the game.
The study had two identical experimental conditions, differing
only by type of candidate rationale. Group 1 evaluated
the focused-view rationale while Group 2 evaluated the
complete-view rationales. In each video, the action was
accompanied by three rationales generated by three different
techniques (see Figure 5):
• The exemplary rationale is the rationale from our corpus
that 3 researchers unanimously agreed on as the best one
for a particular action. Researchers independently selected
rationales they deemed best and iterated until consensus was
reached. This is provided as an upper-bound for contrast
with the next two techniques.
• The candidate rationale is the rationale produced by
our network, either the focused-view or complete-view
configuration.
• The random rationale is a randomly chosen rationale from
our corpus.
For each rationale, participants used a 5-point Likert scale to
rate their endorsement of each of following four statements,
which correspond to four dimensions of interest.
1. Confidence: This rationale makes me confident in the
character’s ability to perform it’s task.
2. Human-likeness: This rationale looks like it was made by
a human.
3. Adequate justification: This rationale adequately justifies
the action taken.
4. Understandability: This rationale helped me understand
why the agent behaved as it did.
Response options on a clearly labeled bipolar Likert scale
ranged from ”strongly disagree” to ”strongly agree”. In
a mandatory free-text field, they explained their reasoning
behind the ratings for a particular set of three rationales.
After answering these questions, they provided demographic
information.
These four dimensions emerged from an iterative filtering
process that included preliminary testing of the study, informal
interviews with experts and participants, and a literature review
on robot and technology acceptance models. Inspired by the
acceptance models, we created a set of dimensions that were
contextually appropriate for our purposes.
Direct one-to-one mapping from existing models was not
feasible, given the novelty and context of the Explainable
AI technology. We adapted confidence, a dimension that
impacts trust in the system [23], from constructs like
performance expectancy [39] (from UTAUT) and robot
performance [6, 12]. Human-likeness, central to generating
human-centered rationales, was inspired from sociability
and anthropomorphization factors from HRI work on robot
acceptance [[35, 33, 34]. Since our rationales are justificatory
in nature, adequate justification is a reasonable measure of
output quality (transformed from TAM). Our rationales also
need to be understandable, which can signal perceived ease
of use (from TAM).
Quantitative Analysis
We used a multi-level model to analyze our data. All variables
were within-subjects except for one: whether the candidate
style was focused-view (Group 1) or complete-view (Group
2). This was a between-subject variable.
There were significant main effects of rationale style (χ2 (2) =
594.80, p < .001) and dimension (χ2 (2) = 66.86, p < .001)
on the ratings. The main effect of experimental group was
not significant (χ2 (1) = 0.070, p = 0.79). Figure 5 shows
the average responses to each question for the two different
experimental groups. Our results support our hypothesis
that rationales generated with the focused-view generator
and the complete-view generator were judged significantly
better across all dimensions than the random baseline (b =
1.90, t (252) = 8.09, p < .001). In addition, exemplary
rationales were judged significantly higher than candidate
rationales.
Though there were significant differences between each kind
of candidate rationale and the exemplary rationales, those
differences were not the same. The difference between the
focused-view candidate rationales and exemplary rationales
were significantly greater than the difference between
complete-view candidate rationales and exemplary rationales
(p = .005). Surprisingly, this was because the exemplary
rationales were rated lower in the presence of complete-view
candidate rationales (t (1530) = −32.12, p < .001). Since
three rationales were presented simultaneously in each video,
it is likely that participants were rating the rationales relative to
each other. We also observe that the complete-view candidate
rationales received higher ratings in general than did the
focused-view candidate rationales (t (1530) = 8.33, p < .001).
In summary, we have confirmed our hypothesis that both
configurations produce rationales that perform significantly
better than the random baseline across all dimensions.
Qualitative Findings and Discussion
In this section, we look at the open-ended responses
provided by our participants to better understand the criteria
that participants used when making judgments about the
confidence, human-likeness, adequate justification, and
understandability of generated rationales. These situated
insights augment our understanding of rationale generating
systems, enabling us to design better ones in the future.
We analyzed the open-ended justifications participants
provided using a combination of thematic analysis [4] and
grounded theory [38]. We developed codes that addressed
different types of reasonings behind the ratings of the four
dimensions under investigation. Next, the research team
clustered the codes under emergent themes, which form
the underlying components of the dimensions. Iterating
until consensus was reached, researchers settled on the
(a) Focus-View condition.
(b) Complete-View condition.
Figure 5: Human judgment results.
five most relevant components: (1) Contextual Accuracy,
(2) Intelligibility, (3) Awareness, (4) Relatability, and
(5) Strategic Detail (see Table 3). At varying degrees, multiple
components influence more than one dimension; that is, there
isn’t a mutually exclusive one-to-one relationship between
components and dimensions.
We will now share how these components influence the
dimensions of the human factors under investigation. When
providing examples of our participants’ responses, we will
use P1 to refer to participant 1, P2 for participant 2, etc.
To avoid priming during evaluation, we used letters (e.g.,
A, B, C, etc.) to refer to the different types of rationales.
For better comprehension, we have substituted the letters
with appropriate rationale–focused-view, complete-view, or
random– while presenting quotes from participants below.
Confidence (1)
This dimension gauges the participant’s faith in the agent’s
ability to successfully complete it’s task and has contextual
accuracy, awareness, strategic detail, and intelligibility as
relevant components. With respect to contextual accuracy,
rationales that displayed “. . . recognition of the environmental
conditions and [adaptation] to the conditions” (P22) were a
positive influence, while redundant information such as “just
stating the obvious” (P42) hindered confidence ratings.
Table 2: Descriptions for the emergent components underlying
the human-factor dimensions of the generated rationales.
Component Description
Contextual
Accuracy
Accurately describes pertinent
events in the context of the
environment.
Intelligibility Typically error-free and is coherent
in terms of both grammar and
sentence structure.
Awareness Depicts and adequate understanding
of the rules of the environment.
Relatability Expresses the justification of the
action in a relatable manner and
style.
Strategic Detail Exhibits strategic thinking,
foresight, and planning.
Rationales that showed awareness of “upcoming dangers and
what the best moves to make . . . [and] a good way to plan”
(P17) inspired confidence from the participants. In terms of
strategic detail, rationales that showed ”. . . long-term planning
and ability to analyze information” (P28) yielded higher
confidence ratings compared to those that were ”short-sighted
and unable to think ahead” (P14) led to lower perceptions of
confidence.
Intelligibility alone, without awareness or strategic detail, was
not enough to yield high confidence in rationales. However,
rationales that were not intelligible (unintelligible) or coherent
had a negative impact on participants’ confidence:
The [random and focused-view rationales] include major
mischaracterizations of the environment because they
refer to an object not present or wrong time sequence, so
I had very low confidence. (P66)
Human-likeness (2)
Intelligibility, relatability, and strategic detail are components
that influenced participants’ perception of the extent to which
the rationales were made by a human. Notably, intelligibility
had mixed influences on the human-likeness of the rationales
as it depended on what participants thought “being human”
entailed. Some conceptualized humans as fallible beings and
rated rationales with errors more humanlike because rationales
“with typos or spelling errors . . . seem even more likely to have
been generated by a human” (P19). Conversely, some thought
error-free rationales must come from a human, citing that a
“computer just does not have the knowledge to understand
what is going on” (P24).
With respect to relatability, rationales were often perceived
as more human-like when participants felt that “it mirrored
[their] thoughts” (P49), and “. . . [laid] things out in a way
that [they] would have” (P58). Affective rationales had high
relatability because they “express human emotions including
hope and doubt” (P11).
Strategic detail had a mixed impact on human-likeness
just like intelligibility as it also depended on participants’
perception of critical thinking and logical planning. Some
participants associated “. . . critical thinking [and ability to]
predict future situations” (P6) with human-likeness whereas
others associated logical planning with non-human-like, but
computer-like rigid and algorithmic thinking process flow.
Adequate Justification (3)
This dimension unpacks the extent to which participants
think the rationale adequately justifies the action taken
and is influenced by contextual accuracy, and awareness.
Participants downgraded rationales containing low levels of
contextual accuracy in the form of irrelevant details. As P11
puts it:
The [random rationale] doesn’t pertain to this situation.
[The complete-view] does, and is clearly the best
justification for the action that Frogger took because it
moves him towards his end goal.
Beyond contextual accuracy, rationales that showcase
awareness of surroundings score high on the adequate
justification dimension. For instance, P11 rated the random
rationale low because it showed “no awareness of the
surroundings”. For the same action, P11 rated exemplary and
focused-view rationales high because each made the participant
“believe in the character’s ability to judge their surroundings.”
Understandability (4)
For this dimension, components such as contextual accuracy
and relatability influence participants’ perceptions of how
much the rationales helped them understand the motivation
behind the agent’s actions. In terms of contextual accuracy,
many expressed how the contextual accuracy, not the length
of the rationale, mattered when it came to understandability.
While comparing understandability of the exemplary and
focused-view rationales, P41 made a notable observation:
The [exemplary and focused-view rationale] both
described the activities/objects in the immediate vicinity
of the frog. However, [exemplary rationale (typically
lengthier than focused)] was not as applicable because
the [focused-view] rationale does a better job of providing
contextual understanding of the action.
Participants put themselves in the agent’s shoes and evaluated
the understandability of the rationales based on how relatable
they were. In essence, some asked “Are these the same reasons
I would [give] for this action?” (P43). The more relatable the
rationale was, the higher it scored for understandability.
In summary, the first study establishes the plausibility of the
generated rationales (compared to baselines) and their user
perceptions. However, this study does not provide direct
comparison between the two configurations.
PREFERENCE STUDY: FOCUSED– VS. COMPLETE–VIEW
RATIONALES
The preference study puts the rationales in direct comparison
with each other. This study It achieves two main purposes.
First, it aims to validate the alignment between the intended
design of rationale types and the actual perceived differences
between them. We collect qualitative data on how participants
perceived rationales produced by our focused-view and
complete-view rationale generator. Our expert observation
is that the focused-view configuration results in concise and
localized rationales whereas the complete-view configuration
results in detailed, holistic rationales. We seek to determine
whether naı¨ve users who are unaware of which configuration
produced a rationale also describe the rationales in this way.
Second, we seek to understand how and why the preferences
between the two styles differed along three dimensions:
confidence, failure, and unexpected behavior.
Method
Using similar methods to the first study, we recruited and
analyzed the data from 65 people (age range = 23 - 59 years,
M = 38.48, SD = 10.16). 57% percent of the participants were
women with 96% of the participants self-reporting the United
States and 4% self-reporting India as countries they were from.
Participants from our first study could not partake in the second
one. The average task duration was approximately 46 minutes.
The only difference in the experimental setup between
perception and the preference study is the comparison groups
of the rationales. In this study, participants judged the same
set of focused- and complete-view rationales, however instead
of judging each style against two baselines, participants
evaluate the focused- and complete-view rationales in direction
comparison with each other.
Having watched the videos and accompanying rationales,
participants responded to the following questions comparing
both configurations:
1. Most important difference: What do you see as the most
important difference? Why is this difference important to
you?
2. Confidence: Which style of rationale makes you more
confident in the agent’s ability to do its task? Was it system
A or system B? Why?
3. Failure: If you had a companion robot that had just made
a mistake, would you prefer that it provide rationales like
System A or System B? Why?
4. Unexpected Behaviour: If you had a companion robot that
took an action that was not wrong, but unexpected from your
perspective, would you prefer that it provides rationales like
System A or System B? Why?
We used a similar to the process of selecting dimensions in
this study as we did in the first one. Confidence is crucial
to trust especially when failure and unexpected behavior
happens [12, 23]. Collaboration, tolerance, and perceived
intelligence are affected by the way autonomous agents and
robots communicate failure and unexpected behavior [15, 24,
25, 32].
Quantitative Analysis
In order to determine whether the preferences significantly
favored one style or the other, we conducted the Wilcoxon
signed-rank test. It showed that preference for the
complete-view rationale was significant in all three dimensions.
Table 3: Tally of how many preferred the focused-view vs. the
complete-view for the three dimensions.
Question Focused-view Complete-view
Confidence 15 48
Failure 17 46
Unexpected Behaviour 18 45
Confidence in the complete-view rationale was significantly
greater than in the focused-view (p < .001). Similarly,
preference for a complete-view rationales from an agent that
made a mistake was significantly greater than for focused-view
rationales (p < .001). Preference for complete-view rationales
from an agent that made a mistake was also significantly
greater than for focused-view rationales (p < .001).
Qualitative Findings and Discussion
In this section, similar to the first study, we share insights
gained from the open-ended responses to reveal the underlying
reasons behind perceptions of the most important difference
between the two styles. We also unpack the reasoning behind
the quantitative ranking preferences for confidence in the
agent’s ability to do its task and communication preferences
for failure and unexpected behavior. In this analysis, the
interacting components that influenced the dimensions of
human factors in the first study return (see Table 3). In
particular, we use them as analytic lenses to highlight the
trade-offs people make when expressing their preferences and
the reasons for the perceived differences between the styles.
These insights bolster our situated understanding of the
differences between the two rationale generation techniques
and assist to verify if the intended design of the two
configurations aligns with the perceptions of them. In essence,
did the design succeed in doing what we set out to do? We
analyzed the open-ended responses in the same manner as
the first study. We use the same nomenclature to refer to
participants.
Most Important Difference (1)
Every participant indicted that the level of detail and
clarity (P55) differentiated the rationales. Connected to
the level of detail and clarity is the perceived long- vs.
short-term planning exhibited by each rationale. Overall,
participants felt that the complete-view rationale showed better
levels of strategic detail, awareness, and relatability with
human-like justifications, whereas the focused-view exhibited
better intelligibility with easy-to-understand rationales. The
following quote illustrates the trade-off between succinctness,
which hampers comprehension of higher-order goals, and
broadness, which can be perceived as less focused:
The [focused-view rationale] is extraordinarily vague and
focused on the raw mechanics of the very next move
. . . [The complete-view] is more broad and less focused,
but takes into account the entire picture. So I would
say the most important difference is the scope of events
that they take into account while making justifications
[emphasis added] (P24)
Beyond trade-offs, this quote highlights a powerful validating
point: without any knowledge beyond what is shown on
the video, the participant pointed out how the complete-view
rationale appeared to consider the ”entire picture” and how the
”scope of events” taken into account was the main difference.
The participant’s intuition precisely aligns with the underlying
network configuration design and our research intuitions.
Recall that the complete-view rationale was generated using
the entire environment or ”picture” whereas the focused-view
was generated using a windowed input.
In prior sections, we speculated on the effects of the network
configurations. We expected the focused-view version to
produce succinct, localized rationales that concentrated on the
short-term. We expected the complete-view version to produce
detailed, broader rationales that focused on the larger picture
and long-term planning. The findings of this experiment are
the first validation that the outputs reflect the intended designs.
The strength of this validation was enhanced by the many
descriptions of our intended attributes, given in free-form by
participants who were naive to our network designs.
Connected to the level of detail and clarity is the perception
of short- vs long-term thinking from the respective rationales.
In general, participants regarded the focused-view rationale
having low levels of awareness and strategic detail. They
felt that this agent ”. . . focus[ed] only on the current step”
(P44), which was perceived depicting as thinking ”. . . in
the spur of the moment” (P27), giving the perception of
short-term and simplistic thinking. On the other hand, the
complete-view rationale appeared to ”. . . try to think it through”
(P27), exhibiting long-term thinking as it appears to ”. . . think
forward to broader strategic concerns.”(P65) One participant
sums it up nicely:
The [focused-view rationale] focused on the immediate
action required. [The complete-view rationale] took into
account the current situation, [but] also factored in what
the next move will be and what dangers that move poses.
The [focused-view] was more of a short term decision
and [complete-view] focused on both short term and long
term goals and objectives. (P47)
We will notice how these differences in perception impact
other dimensions such as confidence and communication
preferences for failure and unexpected behavior.
Confidence (2)
Participants had more confidence in the agent’s ability to do
its task if the rationales exhibited high levels of strategic
detail in the form of long-term planning, awareness via
expressing knowledge of the environment, and relatability
through humanlike expressions. They associated conciseness
with confidence when the rationales did not need to be detailed
given the context of the (trivial) action.
The complete-view rationale inspired more confidence because
participants perceived agents with long-term planning and
high strategic detail as being ”more predictive” and intelligent
than their counterparts. Participants felt more at ease because
”. . . knowing what [the agent] was planning to do ahead of
time would allow me to catch mistakes earlier before it makes
them.” (P31) As one participant put it:
The [complete-view rationale] gives me more confidence
. . . because it thinks about future steps and not just the
steps you need to take in the moment. [The agent
with focused-view] thinks more simply and is prone to
mistakes. (P13)
Participants felt that rationales that exhibited a better
understanding of the environment, and thereby better
awareness, resulted in higher confidence scores. Unlike
the focused-view rationale that came across as ”a simple
reactionary move . . . [the complete-view] version demonstrated
a more thorough understanding of the entire field of play.”
(P51) In addition, the complete-view was more relatable and
confidence-inspiring ”because it more closely resemble[d]
human judgment” (P29).
Failure (3)
When an agent or a robot fails, the information from the
failure report is mainly used to fix the issue. To build a mental
model of the agent, participants preferred detailed rationales
with solid explanatory power stemming from awareness and
relatability. The mental model could facilitate proactive and
preventative care.
The complete-view rationale, due to relatively high strategic
detail, was preferable in communicating failure because
participants could ”. . . understand the full reasoning behind the
movements.”(P16) Interestingly, detail trumped intelligibility
in most circumstances. Even if the rationales had some
grammatical errors or were a ”. . . little less easy to read, the
details made up for it.” (P62)
However, detailed rationales are not always a virtue. Simple
rationales have the benefit of being easily understandable
to humans, even if they cause humans to view the agent as
having limited understanding capabilities. Some participants
appreciated focused-view rationales because they felt ”it would
be easier to figure out what went wrong by focusing on one
step at a time.”
Explanatory power, specifically how events are communicated,
is related to awareness and relatability. Participants preferred
relatable agents that ”. . . would talk to [them] like a person
would.”(P11) They expressed the need to develop a mental
model, especially to ”. . . see how [a robot’s] mind might be
working”(P1), to effectively fix the issue. The following
participant neatly summarizes the dynamics:
I’d want [the robot with complete-view] because I’d
have a better sense of the steps taken that lead to the
mistake. I could then fix a problem within that reasoning
to hopefully avoid future mistakes. The [focused-view
rationale] was just too basic and didn’t give enough detail.
(P8)
Unexpected Behavior (4)
Unexpected behavior that is not failure makes people want to
know the ”why?” behind the action, especially to understand
the expectancy violation. As a result, participants preferred
rationales with transparency so that they can understand
and trust the robot in a situation where expectations are
violated. In general, preference was for adequate levels of
detail and explanatory power that could provide ”. . . more
diagnostic information and insight into the robot’s thinking
processes.”(P19) Participants wanted to develop mental
models of the robots so they could understand the world
from the robot’s perspective. This diagnostic motivation for a
mental model is different from the re-programming or fixing
needs in cases of failure.
The complete-view rationale, due to adequate levels of
strategic detail, made participants more confident in their
ability to follow the thought process and get a better
understanding of the expectancy violation. One participant
shared:
The greater clarity of thought in the [complete-view]
rationale provides a more thorough picture . . . , so that
the cause of the unexpected action could be identified
and explained more easily. (P51)
With this said, where possible without sacrificing transparency,
participants welcomed simple rationales that ”anyone could
understand, no matter what their level of education was.”(P2)
This is noteworthy because the expertness level of the
audience is a key concern when making accessible AI-powered
technology where designers need to strike a balance between
detail and succinctness.
Rationales exhibiting strong explanatory power, through
awareness and relatability, helps to situate the unexpected
behavior in an understandable manner. Participants preferred
the complete-view rationale’s style of communication because
of increased transparency:
I prefer [the complete-view rationale style] because . . . I
am able to get a much better picture of why it is making
those decisions. (P24)
Despite similarities in the communication preferences for
failure and unexpected behavior, there are differences in
underlying reasons. As our analysis suggests, the mental
models are desired in both cases, but for different reasons.
DESIGN LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The situated understanding of the components and dimensions
give us a powerful set of actionable insights that can
help us design better human-centered, rationale-generating,
autonomous agents. As our analysis reveals, context is king.
Depending on the context, we can tweak the input type to
generate rationale sytles that meet the needs of the task or
agent persona; for instance, a companion agent that requires
high relatability for user engagement. We should be mindful
when optimizing for a certain dimension as each component
comes with costs. For instance, conciseness can improve
intelligibility and overall understandability but comes at the
cost of strategic detail, which can hurt confidence in the
agent. We can also engineer systems such that multiple
network configurations act as modules. For instance, if
we design a companion agent or robot that interacts with
a person longitudinally, the focused-view configuration can
take over when short and simple rationales are required. The
complete-view configuration or a hybrid one can be activated
when communicating failure or unexpected behavior.
As our preference study shows, we should not only be
cognizant about the level of detail, but also why the detail
is necessary, especially while communicating failure and
unexpected behavior. For instance, failure-reporting, in a
mission critical task (such as search and rescue), would have
different requirements for strategic detail and awareness,
compared to ”failure” reporting in a less-defined, more creative
task like making music. While the focus of this paper is on
textual rationale generation, rationales can be complementary
to other types of explanations; for instance, a multi-modal
system can combine visual cues with textual rationales to
provide better contextual explanations for an agent’s actions.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
While these results are promising, there are several limitations
in our approach that need to be addressed in future work. First,
our current system, by intention and design, lacks interactivity;
users cannot contest a rationale or ask the agent to explain in
a different way. To a get a formative understanding, we kept
the design as straight-forward as possible. Now that we have
a baseline understanding, we can vary along the dimension of
interactivity for the next iteration. For instance, contestability,
the ability to either reject a reasoning or ask for another one,
which has shown to improve user satisfactions [22, 16] can be
incorporated in the future. Second, our data collection pipeline
is currently designed to work with discrete-action games that
have natural break points where the player can be asked for
explanations. In continuous-time and -action environments,
we must determine how to collect the necessary data without
being too intrusive to participants. Third, all conclusions about
our approach were formed based on one-time interactions with
the system. To better control for potential novelty effects that
rationales could have, we need to deploy our system in a
longitudinal task setting. Fourth, to understand the feasibility
of our system in larger state-action spaces, we would need
to study the scalability by addressing the question of how
much data is needed based on the size of environment. Fifth,
not all mistakes are created equal. Currently, the perception
ratings are averaged where everything is equally weighted.
For instance, a mistake during a mission critical step can lead
to higher fall in confidence than the same mistake during a
non-critical step. To understand the relative costs of mistakes,
we need to further investigate the relationship between context
of the task and the cost of the mistake.
CONCLUSIONS
While explainability has been successfully introduced for
classification and captioning tasks, sequential environments
offer a unique challenge for generating human understandable
explanations. The challenge stems from multiple complex
factors, such as temporally connected decision-making, that
contribute to making decisions in these environments. In
this paper, we introduce automated rationale generation as
a concept and explore how justificatory explanations from
humans can be used to train systems to produce human-like
explanations in sequential environments. To facilitate this
work, we also introduce a pipeline for automatically gathering
a parallel corpus of states annotated with human explanations.
This tool enables us to systematically gather high quality
data for training purposes. We then use this data to train
a model that uses machine translation technology to generate
human-like rationales in the arcade game, Frogger.
Through a mixed-methods approach in evaluation, we
establish the plausibility of the generated rationales and
describe how intended design of rationale types lines up
with the actual user perceptions of them. We also get
contextual understanding of the underlying dimensions and
components that influence human perception and preferences
of the generated rationales. By enabling autonomous agents
to communicate about the motivations for their actions, we
envision a future where explainability not only improves
human-AI collaboration, but does so in a human–centered
and understandable manner.
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